GBP/USD Price Forecast: Pound Rally Awaits NFP Confirmation

GBP/USD Price Forecast: Pound Rally Awaits NFP Confirmation

GBPUSD FUNDAMENTAL BACKDROP

The British pound has been given a significant boost after concern around the US debt ceiling has been lifted. Risk sentiment across currency markets has improved alongside commentary by Fed officials of a possible pause in the June meeting to acquire more data to generate a clearer picture of the US economy. A comparatively more hawkish Bank of England (BoE) now expected to hike again later this month due to elevated UK inflation has supplemented the bullish bias for the pound.

BANK OF ENGLAND INTEREST RATE PROBABILITIES

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The economic calendar today is dominated by the US Non-Farm Payroll (NFP) report (see economic calendar below) which I cover extensively in my NFP Preview. From a cable perspective, this release may extend the rally (NFP miss or in line with estimates) or cap upside should the report come in stronger than expected.

ECONOMIC CALENDAR

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TECHNICAL ANALYSIS

GBP/USD WEEKLY CHART

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Chart prepared by Warren Venketas, IG

The weekly cable chart shows a possible weekly close in the form of a bullish engulf (black), opening up room for further upside for sterling.

GBP/USD DAILY CHART

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The daily chart highlights the key area of confluence around the 1.2545 resistance zone (blue) – an area bears have defended relentlessly of recent. A confirmation daily close above this level could approve the longer term bullish engulf and expose subsequent resistance zones.

Key resistance levels:

  • 1.2680
  • 1.2584
  • 1.2545 (blue zone)

Key support levels:

  • 1.2500
  • 50-day MA (yellow)

BULLISH IG CLIENT SENTIMENT

IG Client Sentiment Data (IGCS) shows retail traders are currently net SHORT on GBP/USD with 58% of traders holding short positions (as of this writing). At DailyFX we typically take a contrarian view to crowd sentiment resulting in a short-term upside disposition.

How to Read a Candlestick Chart

How to Read a Candlestick Chart

Reading candlestick charts – Talking points:

  • Candlestick charts differ greatly from the traditional bar chart
  • Traders generally prefer using candlestick charts for day-trading because they offer an enjoyable visual perception of price
  • It’s important to understand the key components of a candle, and what they indicate, to apply candlestick chart analysis to a trading strategy

What is a candlestick chart?

A candlestick chart is simply a chart composed of individual candles, which traders use to understand price action. Candlestick price action involves pinpointing where the price opened for a period, where the price closed for a period, as well as the price highs and lows for a specific period.

Price action can give traders of all financial markets clues to trend and reversals. For example, groups of candlesticks can form patterns which occur throughout forex charts that could indicate reversals or continuation of trends. Candlesticks can also form individual formations which could indicate buy or sell entries in the market.

The period that each candle depicts depends on the time-frame chosen by the trader. A popular time-frame is the daily time-frame, so the candle will depict the open, close, and high and low for the day. The different components of a candle can help you forecast where the price might go, for instance if a candle closes far below its open it may indicate further price declines.

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Interpreting a candle on a candlestick chart

The image below represents the design of a typical candlestick. There are three specific points (open, close, wicks) used in the creation of a price candle. The first points to consider are the candles’ open and close prices. These points identify where the price of an asset begins and concludes for a selected period and will construct the body of a candle. Each candle depicts the price movement for a certain period that you choose when you look at the chart. If you are looking at a daily chart each individual candle will display the open, close, upper and lower wick of that day.

A red and a blue candlestick with open and close wicks

Open price:

The open price depicts the first price traded during the formation of the new candle. If the price starts to trend upwards the candle will turn green/blue (colors vary depending on chart settings). If the price declines the candle will turn red.

High Price:

The top of the upper wick/shadow indicates the highest price traded during the period. If there is no upper wick/shadow it means that the open price or the close price was the highest price traded.

Low Price:

The lowest price traded is the either the price at the bottom of the lower wick/shadow and if there is no lower wick/shadow then the lowest price traded is the same as the close price or open price in a bullish candle.

Close Price:

The close price is the last price traded during the period of the candle formation. If the close price is below the open price the candle will turn red as a default in most charting packages. If the close price is above the open price the candle will be green/blue (also depends on the chart settings).

The Wick:

The next important element of a candlestick is the wick, which is also referred to as a ‘shadow’. These points are vital as they show the extremes in price for a specific charting period. The wicks are quickly identifiable as they are visually thinner than the body of the candlestick. This is where the strength of candlesticks becomes apparent. Candlesticks can help traders keep our eye on market momentum and away from the static of price extremes.

Direction:

The direction of the price is indicated by the color of the candlestick. If the price of the candle is closing above the opening price of the candle, then the price is moving upwards and the candle would be green (the color of the candle depends on the chart settings). If the candle is red, then the price closed below the open.

Range:

The difference between the highest and lowest price of a candle is its range. You can calculate this by taking the price at the top of the upper wick and subtracting it from the price at the bottom of the lower wick. (Range = highest point – lowest point).

Having this knowledge of a candle, and what the points indicate, means traders using a candlestick chart have a clear advantage when it comes to distinguishing trendlines, price patterns and Elliot waves.

Bar Chart vs Candlestick Chart

As you can see from the image below, candlestick charts offer a distinct advantage over bar charts. Bar charts are not as visual as candle charts and nor are the candle formations or price patterns. Also, the bars on the bar chart make it difficult to visualize which direction the price moved.

Difference between bar chart and candle chart

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How to read a candlestick chart

There are various ways to use and read a candlestick chart. Candlestick chart analysis depends on your preferred trading strategy and time-frame. Some strategies attempt to take advantage of candle formations while others attempt to recognize price patterns.

Interpreting single candle formations

Individual candlesticks can offer a lot of insight into current market sentiment. Candlesticks like the Hammer, shooting star, and hanging man, offer clues as to changing momentum and potentially where the market prices maytrend.

As you can see from the image below the Hammer candlestick formation sometimes indicates a reversal in trend. The hammer candle formation has a long lower wick with a small body. Its closing pricing is above its opening price. The intuition behind the hammer formation is simple, price tried to decline but buyers entered the market pushing the price up. It is a bullish signal to enter the market, tighten stop-losses or close out a short position.

Traders can take advantage of hammer formations by executing a long trade once the hammer candle has closed. Hammer candles are advantageous because traders can implement ‘tight’ stop-losses (stop-losses that risk a small amount of pips). Take-profits should be placed in such a way as to ensure a positive risk-reward ratio. So, the take-profit is larger than the stop-loss.

Hammer formation showing stop loss

Recognizing price patterns in multiple candles

Candlestick charts help traders recognize price patterns that occur in the charts. By recognizing these price patterns, like the bullish engulfing pattern or triangle patterns you can take advantage of them by using them as entries into or exit signals out the market.

For example, in the image below we have the bullish engulfing price pattern. The bullish engulfing is a combination of a red candle and a blue candle that ‘engulfs’ the entire red candle. It is an indication that it could be the end of a currency pairs established weakness. A trader would take advantage of this by entering a long position after the blue candle closes. Remember, the price pattern only forms once the second candle closes.

As with the hammer formation, a trader would place a stop loss below the bullish engulfing pattern, ensuring a tight stop loss. The trader would then set a take-profit. For more forex candlestick charts check our forex candlesticks guide where we go in depth into the advantages of candlestick charts as well as the strategies that can be implemented using them.

Bullish engulfing pattern

Further tips for reading candlestick charts

When reading candlestick charts, be mindful of:

At DailyFX we offer a range of forecasts on currencies, oil, equities and gold that can aide you in your trading. It is also worth following our webinars where we present on a variety of topics from price-action to fundamentals that may affect the market.

US Dollar Sluggish as Poor Manufacturing PMI Strengthens Case for Fed Pause

US Dollar Sluggish as Poor Manufacturing PMI Strengthens Case for Fed Pause

A gauge of U.S. factory activity worsened and extended its contraction for the sixth consecutive month in May, a sign that the economy continues to struggle to stabilize in response to weakening demand conditions amid stubbornly high inflation and rapidly rising interest rates.

According to the Institute for Supply Management (ISM), May manufacturing PMI fell to 46.9 from 47.1 previously versus 47.00 expected, hitting its lowest since March. For context, any figure above 50 indicates growth, while readings below that threshold denote a contraction in output.

Looking under the hood, the goods-producing sector of the economy was hindered by a pronounced drop in the new orders indicator, which plunged to 42.6 from 45.7. Meanwhile, the employment and production indices offset weakness elsewhere, with the former rising to 51.4 and the latter climbing to 51.1.

Finally, the prices paid index moderated sharply after a brief rebound in April, plummeting to 44.2 from 53.2, a welcome development for the Fed. Softening cost burdens for manufacturers, if sustained, could help ease inflationary pressures, paving the way for a less aggressive central bank stance.

ISM DATA AT A GLANCE

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Disappointing manufacturing activity results are likely to reinforce the case for the Federal Reserve to hold interest rates steady at its June meeting to assess the lagged effects of cumulative tightening and other economic risks before deciding on the next move.

The increased likelihood of the Fed hitting the pause button should undermine the U.S. dollar in the near term by weighing on Treasury yields. Traders may see a “hold” as the first step toward a dovish pivot, even if policymakers signal that it is a “skip” rather than a prolonged pause or the end of the hiking campaign.

Immediately after the ISM results were released, the U.S. dollar extended session losses as yields retreated further, but then trimmed the decline as the knee-jerk response began to fade. Despite this reaction, the U.S. dollar could head lower in the coming days as markets attempt to front-run the Fed’s incoming action.

US DOLLAR (DXY) 5-MINUTE CHART

A screenshot of a computer screen  Description automatically generated with low confidence

 

USD Index Price Analysis: Potential consolidation ahead of further gains

USD Index Price Analysis: Potential consolidation ahead of further gains

DXY comes under pressure and challenges the 104.00 support on Thursday after hitting fresh multi-week peaks in the boundaries of the 104.70 zone in the previous session.

The index could move into a range bound theme in the very near term ahead of the potential resumption of the uptrend. That said, the surpass of the May high at 104.69 (May 31) should put a potential visit to the key 200-day SMA, today at 105.60, back on the radar prior to the 2023 top of 105.88 (March 8).

Looking at the broader picture, while below the 200-day SMA the outlook for the index is expected to remain negative.

DXY daily chart

What can we learn about monetary policy transmission using international industry-panel data?

What can we learn about monetary policy transmission using international industry-panel data?

How does monetary policy really affect the real economy? What kinds of firms or industries are more sensitive to changes in the stance of monetary policy, and through which exact channels? Despite advances in our understanding of the monetary transmission mechanism, existing studies have not reached a consensus regarding the exact mechanics of transmission. In a recently published Staff Working Paper, we aim to contribute to this understanding by analysing the impact of monetary policy on industry-level outcomes across a broad international industry-panel data set, exploiting the notion that different transmission channels are of varying degrees of importance to different industries.

Covering 105 countries and 22 industries from 1973 to 2019, our study combines estimates of monetary policy surprises with industry-level data to identify the industries which are particularly sensitive to changes in monetary policy. Industry-level data are especially informative on the monetary transmission mechanism since factors determining the sensitivity to monetary policy typically vary more across industries within a country than across countries.

New measures of international monetary policy shocks

We compile a comprehensive international data set on monetary policy shocks, which covers not only advanced economies but also numerous emerging market and developing economies. In order to identify the causal impact of monetary policy, it is necessary to disentangle unexpected changes in the stance of monetary policy (also known as monetary policy ‘shocks’ or ‘surprises’) from policy rate movements that occur systematically in response to changes in variables like inflation or growth. Otherwise, it is not clear whether the observed subsequent movement in (say) inflation caused monetary policy to respond, or whether the causality actually runs in the opposite direction (from monetary policy to inflation, which is the direction of causality monetary policy makers are most interested in). Understanding the direction of causality is crucial when it comes to conducting policy counterfactuals (‘what would happen if the central bank increased the interest rate by 50 instead of 25 basis points?’), which is why we are interested in creating a broad database of such shocks.

In many emerging/developing economies, it is difficult to identify unexpected monetary surprises due to data limitations. Consequently, we utilised a hierarchical approach that prioritised surprise measures generated by methods that are deemed superior, according to the following hierarchy: (i) shocks identified by others via high-frequency methods (such as Cesa-Bianchi et al (2020) for the UK) which is seen as the gold standard, (ii) changes in the short-term yield around dates involving monetary policy decisions (the idea being that these changes capture the ‘surprise’ component associated with each monetary policy decision), (iii) the surprise-component implied by interest rate forecasts from Bloomberg’s survey of financial market participants, (iv) deviations from an estimated Taylor rule (a way for the central bank to set its policy rate as a function of inflation and growth), and (v) in case of countries that peg their exchange rate: the estimated monetary policy shock in the anchor country (often the US, for which we conveniently have high-quality shock estimates generated through high-frequency methods).

Figure 1 shows that using the resulting monetary policy shocks in a panel Vector Auto Regression model produces conventional ‘contractionary’ responses in the cyclical components of real GDP and the GDP deflator, giving credence to the underlying shock series that sits at the core of our analysis. These impulse-responses were estimated on data from the 105 countries included in our analysis and can be seen as cross-country averages.

Figure 1: Impulse responses following a positive monetary policy shock

Note: Dashed lines represent the 95% confidence interval.

Test of various theoretical channels of monetary policy transmission

To investigate the transmission of monetary policy, we use our newly constructed monetary surprise data and adopt a ‘difference-in-differences’ approach that interacts monetary surprises with industry-level characteristics – essentially asking whether industries that score higher along a particular dimension are more sensitive to monetary surprises. In particular, we implement this strategy by estimating regressions of the following type (which follows the approach underlying Rajan and Zingales (1998) who used it to estimate the impact of financial development on growth):

Yi,c,t+1 = αi,c + αi,t + αc,t + β (Xi × MPSc,t) + εi,c,t+1 (1)

In equation (1) the subscript i denotes industries, c countries, and t years. Yi,c,t is a measure of output growth in industry i, in country c in year t. The variable Xi characterises industry i along eight dimensions (such as external financial dependence, asset tangibility, and durability of output; see Table B); MPSc,t is our measure of the monetary policy shock for each country c during year t (with positive values indicating monetary contractions). Regression (1) also contains industry-country, industry-time, and country-time fixed effects (αi,c, αi,t, and αc,t, respectively). This constitutes a powerful set of controls (with αc,t for example controlling for the aggregate state of the economy), reducing any lingering concerns about omitted variables, model misspecification, or reverse causality; the fact that we use monetary policy shocks further helps on this front.

The main object of interest in equation (1) is β, the coefficient on the interaction term (Xi × MPSc,t). The interpretation of β is akin to a difference in differences approach, which measures the differential impact of monetary contractions in industries with characteristics as proxied by Xi. This coefficient is informative about what type of industries are particularly affected by the monetary policy shock, which is, in turn, informative about the importance of the various transmission channels. When the estimate of β < 0, this means that a monetary contraction (MPS > 0) ends up having a larger negative effect on output growth in industries that score higher along characteristic X.

This approach enables us to examine four prominent transmission channels that have been identified in the literature, namely: the interest rate channel, the credit channel, the exchange rate channel, and the cost channel (see Table A for a brief description of each channel). The dimensions we investigate are summarised in Table B, along with their predicted effect according to the various transmission channels.

Table A: Description of transmission mechanisms included in our analysis

Table B: Industry-level characteristics and associated theoretical channels

Our results reveal that industries with assets that are more difficult to collateralise (ie, industries with lower asset tangibility, lower investment intensity, greater labour intensity, and higher depreciation) experience a more substantial decline in output in response to an unanticipated monetary contraction, followed by industries that produce durable goods. The latter finding lends support to the interest rate channel (predicting that consumption of durables falls after a monetary tightening), while the former finding highlights the crucial role of financial frictions and the associated credit channel. In particular, our results point to the importance of unsecured financing in the monetary transmission mechanism, with a ‘flight to quality’ (ie, towards secured financing) in downturns. This poses a challenge for models in the spirit of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), where the liquidation value of secured debt drives/amplifies the business cycle, but provides support for models featuring both secured and unsecured lending (see, eg, Luk and Zheng (2022)).

Conversely, we do not find consistent evidence to support the hypothesis that exporting industries are more vulnerable to monetary tightening. Instead, our findings are more in line with the theory of ‘dominant currency pricing’ where widespread US dollar-invoicing (meaning that trades between countries tend to be denominated in US dollars, even when neither country that is party to the trade uses the dollar as legal tender) implies that exports are relatively insensitive to fluctuations in the exchange rate (with most of the action happening on the side of imports). Additionally, we fail to find evidence to support the cost channel (predicting that prices go up after a rate increase, due to borrowing costs being part of the production process): if anything, we find that relative prices of products produced by industries that are more likely to borrow to satisfy their working capital needs tend to decrease following monetary contractions, thus going against the prediction of the cost channel. This supports the conventional view among policymakers that rate hikes work to reduce inflation, not fuel it (as critics occasionally claim).

Conclusions and policy implications

Our results suggest that the effects of changes in the stance of monetary policy are likely to be heterogeneous, with output in industries producing durables and industries that have lower access to collateral being more responsive. This points to transmission taking place via the interest rate channel and the credit channel. Estimates in our paper also indicate that the credit channel becomes less important as a country’s level of financial development increases. That suggests that, of the channels considered by our paper, it is the interest rate channel (running via durable purchases) that may be most important to a financially developed country like the UK.

With respect to our results on prices (in particular, the absence of evidence for the cost channel of monetary policy), our results provide support to the conventional view that interest rate hikes work to lower inflation.

Finally, we hope that our database (containing monetary policy shock estimates in over 170 countries, available for downloading) will prove useful to other researchers in answering related or different questions.

Account of the monetary policy meeting of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank held in Frankfurt am Main on 3-4 May 2023

Account of the monetary policy meeting of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank held in Frankfurt am Main on 3-4 May 2023

1. Review of financial, economic and monetary developments and policy options

Financial market developments

Ms Schnabel noted that since the Governing Council’s previous monetary policy meeting, the market narrative had shifted back from financial stability concerns to inflation concerns and to potential effects on the economy from the turbulence in the banking sector. Markets seemed so far to have digested the bank failures well, especially in the euro area. Measures of systemic stress, volatility and market liquidity had returned to close to their levels before the failure of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB). Risk assets in the euro area had not only largely recovered the losses experienced following the SVB failure, but in some cases had even rallied to new multi-year highs. Sovereign bond spreads had also shown remarkable resilience. Yet investors had significantly scaled back expectations of ECB monetary policy tightening. While the sharp downward shift in expectations for monetary policy rates at the height of the banking tensions had been partially reversed, the peak rate expected for the deposit facility remained around 50 basis points below levels priced in before the failure of SVB. Three potential factors could explain this repricing: receding inflation risks, heightened recession fears in the face of tighter financial conditions, or financial stability concerns. However, none of these explanations was fully borne out by financial market data.

On the basis of market pricing, current risks of systemic stress seemed contained. Implied volatility in US bond markets had retreated to its 2022 average from very high levels in mid-March, while stock market implied volatility in the United States had recently fallen to its lowest level since November 2021. Similarly, liquidity conditions in euro area sovereign bond markets had normalised.

The turbulence had left a lasting mark on bank stock indices, which remained below the levels observed before SVB’s failure. However, euro area bank stocks currently stood above their level at the start of 2023, and spillovers from the financial sector to the non-financial corporate sector had been limited. Prices for risk assets had generally been less adversely affected in the euro area than in the United States.

The general resilience of financial markets also extended to sovereign bonds. Sovereign spreads had widened only slightly after the SVB failure, had normalised quickly after the banking tensions had subsided and had since remained close to their pre-SVB levels. This resilience had not been challenged by evolving market expectations for the reduction of the asset purchase programme (APP) portfolio. Both the start of quantitative tightening and expectations of a full roll-off had been absorbed smoothly by the market.

Despite fading concerns about market turbulence, investors had, in response to the banking tensions, significantly scaled back expectations for future ECB interest rate hikes.

A first possible explanation for the pronounced repricing of expectations for ECB interest rates could be receding concerns about inflation risks in the euro area. The decline in inflation-linked swap (ILS) forward rates, which had started at the beginning of March, had continued with the onset of the banking turbulence, in line with an initially disinflationary effect from the turbulence. At the same time, market participants did not seem to see the risks to the longer-term inflation outlook as having been alleviated by the banking tensions. The five-year forward ILS rate five years ahead had remained stubbornly above 2.4% since the Governing Council’s March monetary policy meeting. Investors continued to consider a scenario where inflation remained above target over the longer term significantly more probable than a scenario where it dropped below 2%.

An alternative explanation for the repricing of monetary policy expectations was the perception that tighter financial conditions made a recession more likely, implying less need for further rate hikes. However, most common financial conditions indices for the euro area had remained broadly unchanged since the collapse of SVB, even though bank lending rates had been increasing. There was also little indication in financial markets that the banking sector stress had affected economic growth. Investors were currently pricing in only marginally higher tail risks to the economic outlook for the euro area compared with the pre-SVB period.

The evolution of the exchange rate provided further insights into the expected impact of the banking sector turbulence on the economy. Since the start of the banking tensions the euro had appreciated discernibly against the US dollar, in line with the narrowing of the two-year interest rate differential between the euro area and the United States. Monetary policy convergence between the ECB and the Federal Reserve System seemed to have been a key driver of the euro’s appreciation. The scaling back of rate hike expectations had been greater in the United States than in the euro area. Positive economic data surprises in the euro area had also supported the euro, whereas rising downside risks to the US growth outlook had put pressure on the dollar. All in all, euro-dollar exchange rate developments were consistent with a more muted impact of the banking tensions on the economic outlook in the euro area than in the United States.

A third possible explanation for the repricing of interest rate expectations was related to financial stability concerns. With net outflows of deposits from euro area banks, market-based funding was becoming more important. However, short-term funding conditions in the interbank market had returned to pre-SVB conditions. The increase in credit and liquidity risk premia in money markets in mid-March had proved to be only temporary. Similarly, the effect on longer-term market funding conditions had been limited, and asset swap spreads of bank bonds had also almost returned to pre-SVB levels. At the same time, banks’ increasing use of longer-term bond market funding as an alternative to deposit funding tended to increase their average funding costs. Finally, the vulnerability of banks to rising interest rates depended not only on funding considerations but also on the assets side of their balance sheets. Overall, short-run risks to euro area banks from higher interest rates appeared to be contained.

The global environment and economic and monetary developments in the euro area

Mr Lane went through the latest economic, monetary and financial developments in the global economy and the euro area since the Governing Council’s last monetary policy meeting.

Global economic activity had been stronger than expected in early 2023. The global composite output Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) had risen further in March and reached 51.8 in the first quarter, up from 48.4 in the last quarter of 2022. At the same time, PMI data signalled a divergence between services, which continued to expand, and manufacturing, which had weakened further into contractionary territory. Since the services sector was less trade-intensive, world trade had remained weak. The euro had appreciated both against the US dollar and in nominal effective terms. Compared with the March ECB staff macroeconomic projections, non-energy commodity prices had remained broadly unchanged, while the current oil futures curve was lower and slightly more steeply downward-sloping. The gas futures curve was also lower, although slightly more upward-sloping at the end of the year than embedded in the ECB projections.

Euro area GDP growth in the first quarter of the year – at 0.1% according to Eurostat’s preliminary flash estimate – had been broadly in line with the March staff projections. Excluding the strong negative growth rate for Ireland, it was slightly higher, at 0.2%. The available country data pointed to a positive contribution from net trade owing to buoyant exports, which was offset by a negative contribution from domestic demand. At the same time, developments differed significantly across countries, depending on the relative importance of services versus manufacturing. Lower energy prices, the easing of supply bottlenecks and fiscal policy support for firms and households had continued to shore up the economy. Manufacturing activity was still benefiting from a backlog of orders but its prospects were worsening, as was visible in the manufacturing output PMI for April. The services sector was growing more strongly, owing to the reopening of the economy.

Private domestic demand, especially consumption, was likely to have remained weak. Households were less inclined to purchase “big ticket” items, as the impulse from the additional savings accumulated over the pandemic had progressively waned and financing conditions were tightening. For instance, in the first two months of the year, retail sales and car registrations had declined from their levels at the end of 2022 by 0.4% and 3.7% respectively. The asset allocation of savings flows showed that households had accumulated money in bank accounts during 2020. However, the deposits were subsequently used by and large not to consume more but to invest in other financial assets or in capital formation, chiefly housing. Since 2022 they had also been used to repay debt, contributing to an increase in the saving ratio at the end of 2022.

Turning to investment, housing investment had been contracting since mid-2022. At the beginning of 2023, building construction had rebounded, thanks to good weather and the buffer from accumulated order backlogs, suggesting a temporary recovery in housing investment. However, the PMI for construction remained in negative territory, pointing to a subdued outlook. Affordability and profitability indicators had both declined sharply at the end of 2022. By contrast, non-housing investment and net exports were expected to have contributed positively to GDP growth in the first quarter of 2023. A recovery in capital goods had been helped by easing supply bottlenecks. However, the new orders PMI for capital goods remained in negative territory. As regards prospects for exports, the PMI for manufacturing orders had remained below the 50 threshold in April, while the PMI for services had returned to expansionary territory.

Looking ahead, model estimates and survey data pointed to a further moderate expansion of GDP in the second and third quarters of 2023, broadly in line with the March projection exercise.

The labour market had remained strong in the first few months of 2023. The unemployment rate had been relatively stable since April of the previous year and fallen to a new historical low of 6.5% in March 2023. Employment had grown steadily through higher labour force participation and higher immigration, with older and highly skilled workers behind the expansion. By contrast, average hours worked had been more sluggish. The employment outlook remained positive, according to the April PMI indicators, but with sectoral differences. The employment PMI for services had increased strongly, while the index for manufacturing had declined marginally, although it remained in expansionary territory. In the construction sector, the employment PMI had been in contractionary territory for a year.

Negotiated wage growth had increased strongly, to slightly above 5% in both January and February, from around 3% in December. But wage growth was more moderate if one-off payments were excluded, with rates of 3.1% in December, 3.7% in January and 3.8% in February. The latest settlements monitored in the ECB wage tracker implied comparable signals for wage growth over the coming 12 months, albeit with significant variation across countries. At the same time, the Indeed high-frequency job postings indicator of wage pressures had moderated since last October. The ECB’s Corporate Telephone Survey showed that large companies expected margins to deteriorate in 2023 from elevated 2021-22 levels. The same firms indicated that they continued to expect wages to rise by 5% in 2023.

The fall in energy prices and easing supply bottlenecks, together with strong labour markets and rising wages, were expected to continue to support the economy in the coming months. Later in the year, however, less scope for catch-up dynamics and progressively tighter financing conditions were likely to act as a drag on economic growth.

According to Eurostat’s flash estimate, the annual inflation rate had been 7.0% in April, having dropped from 8.5% in February to 6.9% in March. The uptick in April was due to a positive base effect for energy inflation. Services inflation had also increased slightly. The inflation rates for all other components of the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) had declined. Inflation excluding energy and food (core inflation) had been 5.6% in April, back to its February level after edging slightly higher in March. Food price inflation had remained elevated at 13.6% in April, after 15.5% in March and 15.0% in February. Overall, price pressures remained strong. The inflation momentum, measured as the annualised three-month over three-month price change, had showed a headline inflation rate of around 4% in April, with energy inflation deeply negative. Momentum had not yet declined for either food or services price inflation. It had decelerated slightly for goods inflation, but was still very high.

Indicators of underlying inflation were elevated and, for now, sent mixed signals. While exclusion-based and model-based measures were already declining, other indicators were only levelling off or still creeping up. Among those measures, the model-based Persistent and Common Component of Inflation (PCCI) was declining more strongly than others since it was more quickly affected by the impact of declining energy prices. At the same time, domestic inflation was still increasing and was more indicative of pressures coming from wages. When information was taken from both indicators, the message was therefore mixed. So it was important to acknowledge that measures of underlying inflation would not be sending the same signal for a while, as there was a large relative price adjustment going on. On the one hand, there was a big decline in energy prices and, on the other hand, a big increase in the price of labour. Measures of underlying inflation that still included past energy shocks and the pressures from wages remained high. These measures were not a good predictor of where inflation would be one or two years from now, however, given the reversal of the energy shock, the easing of bottlenecks and the expectation that the catch-up in low real wage growth would fade over time.

Longer-term inflation expectations reported in the ECB Survey of Professional Forecasters, the Consensus Economics survey and the ECB Survey of Monetary Analysts had remained in the range of 2.0-2.1%. Financial market-based measures of inflation compensation had increased, but excluding higher inflation risk premia they had remained broadly unchanged and close to 2%. The upward movement in inflation expectations reflected in the ECB Consumer Expectations Survey also warranted ongoing monitoring.

Short-term euro area forward rates had increased since the beginning of April, partly reversing their earlier declines in the acute phase of the banking tensions. At present, the forward curve peaked at a rate of around 3.75%, to be reached in the third quarter of this year. Further out, the pricing indicated that increasing probability was attached to cuts in the key ECB interest rates starting in the second quarter of 2024.

Reflecting the rise in the risk-free yield curve, interest rates on bank loans had increased further, while overall credit flows remained low. Widening spreads between bank bonds and risk-free rates in the wake of the banking tensions were likely to affect bank lending behaviour. The latest bank lending survey showed a further strong net tightening in the standards applied by banks to corporate and housing loans, and banks cited higher risk perceptions and lower risk tolerance as the main drivers of their loan decisions. The share of rejected applicants had also increased for all loan categories. In parallel, banks reported declining demand for bank credit, owing to the general level of interest rates, weaker fixed investments for firms and worsening housing market prospects for households. Overall, this constituted a tightening impulse that was likely to add to the factors that were expected to weigh on economic growth and dampen inflation over the next two years.

Monetary policy considerations and policy options

Following its March monetary policy meeting, the Governing Council had announced that policy rate decisions would be based on its assessment of the inflation outlook in light of the incoming economic and financial data, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission.

Overall, the incoming information broadly supported the assessment of the medium-term inflation outlook formed at the March meeting. Headline inflation had declined significantly over recent months, but underlying price pressures remained strong. At the same time, the past rate hikes were being transmitted forcefully to euro area financing and monetary conditions, while the lags and strength of transmission to the real economy remained uncertain.

The incoming information was sending a range of signals. Some developments were expected to dampen medium-term inflation dynamics: lower energy prices, the further easing of bottlenecks, the appreciation of the euro, the decline in global prospects for manufacturing and further global monetary tightening. In the other direction, the current strength of core and food price inflation, together with the level of recent wage agreements, posed upside risks to the March projections, especially in terms of the duration of the inflation adjustment process. Regarding underlying inflation, the signals were mixed: while exclusion-based and model-based measures had started to decline, the domestic and wage-intensive components of inflation were still rising. In addition, the momentum in some of these indicators continued to be substantial. In relation to monetary policy transmission, financing conditions continued to tighten. The latest bank lending survey indicated that the extent of credit tightening was stronger than previously expected by the banks, while the recent tensions in the global banking system might also add to risk aversion, curbing credit supply.

With these considerations in mind, the Governing Council needed to strike the right balance between advancing further towards interest rate levels that were sufficiently restrictive to ensure inflation returned to the 2% target in a timely manner and taking into account the elevated uncertainty regarding the speed and strength of the transmission of the cumulative tightening in the policy stance, including through the credit channel. This argued in favour of raising rates by an increment of 25 basis points at the present meeting. The Governing Council’s emphasis on data-dependence and on articulating the main criteria informing the rate decisions had been very effective in steadying policy expectations.

The APP portfolio was set to decline by €15 billion per month until the end of June 2023. The realised and expected balance sheet normalisation had so far complemented the tightening of policy interest rates in a smooth manner. Looking ahead, the latest Survey of Monetary Analysts had indicated that, beyond June, investors expected to see an acceleration in the pace of reduction of the APP portfolio to a rate that was consistent with a full run-off. To the extent this expectation was priced in by the market, the yield impact of discontinuing APP reinvestments as of July was expected to be small. Against this background, and in line with the Governing Council principle of data-dependence as well as its commitment to reduce the APP portfolio at a measured and predictable pace, Mr Lane proposed that the Governing Council communicate the expectation that reinvestments would be discontinued as of July. Expressing the decision as an expectation would preserve some flexibility in case adverse tail risks were to materialise, in particular with regard to financial market conditions.

2. Governing Council’s discussion and monetary policy decisions

Economic, monetary and financial analyses

As regards the external environment, members took note of the assessment provided by Mr Lane that global growth excluding the euro area had been higher than expected since the start of the year. The upside surprises had been broad-based, in both advanced and emerging economies. In contrast to economic activity, global trade had been relatively weak over the last few months, as demand had rotated towards domestic services. The euro exchange rate had appreciated since the Governing Council’s last monetary policy meeting, which, looking ahead, would contribute to lower inflationary pressures for the euro area. Non-energy commodity prices were broadly unchanged. Oil prices had increased while gas prices had declined, extending their previous large decreases. High inventories had contributed to the improved gas price outlook. In the United States, economic activity was moderating, reflecting weakening domestic demand. In China, real GDP growth had rebounded strongly in the first quarter from its pandemic-induced slump. The reopening of the Chinese economy, with higher than expected growth in China, was mentioned as an external factor that could contribute to lower core inflation in the euro area, as cheap Chinese imports had dampened inflation in Europe and the United States in the past. At the same time, higher demand from China could put upward pressure on global commodity prices, including energy.

With regard to economic activity in the euro area, members concurred with Mr Lane’s assessment that lower energy prices, the easing of supply bottlenecks and fiscal policy support for firms and households had contributed to the resilience of the economy. At the same time, private domestic demand, especially consumption, was likely to have remained weak. Business and consumer confidence had recovered steadily in recent months but remained weaker than before Russia’s unjustified war against Ukraine and its people. There was also a divergence across sectors of the economy. The manufacturing sector was working through a backlog of orders, but its prospects were worsening. The services sector, on the other hand, was growing more strongly, especially owing to the reopening of the economy. Household incomes were benefiting from the strength of the labour market.

Members highlighted the resilience of economic activity so far. The preliminary flash estimate for GDP growth in the first quarter of 2023 had been better than anticipated earlier, especially when taking into account that the aggregate number was most likely to have been pushed down by volatile transactions in Irish intellectual property products, while broadly in line with the March ECB staff projections. Moreover, incoming data suggested that growth could pick up further in the second and third quarters, in line with the March projections. This implied that the euro area economy would manage to escape a recession and that the exit from accommodative monetary policy had so far been smooth.

While the resilience of economic activity was seen as good news, it was nevertheless argued that strengthening activity would contribute to more persistent upward inflation pressures, making a timely return of inflation to target more difficult. However, it was also pointed out that the better than expected GDP growth had mainly been driven by a reversal in the terms-of-trade shock associated with lower energy prices, together with the easing of bottlenecks and an increase in labour supply, which was one factor supporting potential output. These favourable supply forces could allow an increase in GDP while at the same time also favouring disinflation.

The impact of tighter monetary policy was starting to become more visible in financing conditions in the early stages of transmission. At the same time, this raised the question of how much of the impact of tighter monetary policy was already in the pipeline and had yet to materialise, given the remaining uncertainty about long and variable lags in the transmission of monetary policy to output and inflation. In this context, it was mentioned that the impact of tighter monetary policy was becoming visible in non-financial companies’ perceptions of a weaker demand outlook, as flagged in the ECB’s latest Corporate Telephone Survey, as monetary policy was working through slowing aggregate demand. With respect to demand components, as financing conditions were tightening, investment was expected to weaken, partly as a result of the fair amount of uncertainty still clouding the outlook. As to private consumption, consumer services and tourism were still strengthening now that the pandemic had been overcome. Moreover, stronger tourism would also contribute to higher exports as non-euro area tourists returned to the euro area, a development that was not related to labour income growth due to domestic demand.

Members concurred that, as the energy crisis faded, governments should roll back the related support measures promptly and in a concerted manner to avoid driving up medium-term inflationary pressures, which would call for a stronger monetary policy response. In this context, it was argued that the current fiscal stance was out of line with the cyclical position of the economy. Moreover, if there were any fiscal tightening in the future it would likely be “too little too late” to be helpful in bringing inflation back to target. Especially as interest rates were rising, the question was whether governments would manage to tighten their fiscal stance at a time when higher inflation would increasingly weigh on public deficits, owing among other things to higher public wages and pension outlays. At the same time, it was mentioned that the size of the energy-related fiscal measures in 2023 and, as a consequence, the impact on inflation of their removal in 2024, would likely be revised down, in line with lower than expected energy prices. Fiscal policies should be oriented towards making the economy more productive and gradually bringing down high public debt. Policies to enhance the euro area’s supply capacity, especially in the energy sector, could also help reduce price pressures in the medium term. The reform of the EU’s economic governance framework should be concluded soon.

Against this background, the view was expressed that it was no longer evident that the balance of risks to economic activity was skewed to the downside, as had been judged at the preceding monetary policy meeting. Members nonetheless assessed that – even though recent market tensions related to stress in the banking system had largely subsided – renewed financial market tensions, if persistent, would pose a downside risk to the outlook for growth as they could tighten broader credit conditions more strongly than expected and dampen confidence. Russia’s war against Ukraine also continued to be a significant downside risk to the economy. However, the recent reversal of past adverse supply shocks, if sustained, could spur confidence and support higher growth than currently expected. The continued resilience of the labour market, by bolstering household confidence and spending, could also lead to higher growth than anticipated.

With regard to price developments, members broadly agreed with the assessment presented by Mr Lane in his introduction. Inflation was still being pushed up by the gradual pass-through of past energy cost increases and supply bottlenecks. In services, especially, it was still being pushed higher also by pent-up demand from the reopening of the economy and by rising wages. The information available up to March suggested that underlying inflation remained high. Wage pressures had strengthened further as employees, in a context of a robust labour market, recouped some of the purchasing power they had lost as a result of high inflation. Moreover, in some sectors firms had been able to increase their profit margins on the back of mismatches between supply and demand and the uncertainty created by high and volatile inflation. Although most measures of longer-term inflation expectations currently stood at around 2%, some indicators had edged up and warranted continued monitoring.

Members underlined that, while headline inflation had declined substantially from its earlier peak, the inflation outlook was still too high for too long. Inflation data had continued to surprise on the upside, for both headline and core inflation. All inflation components other than energy prices were significantly higher than had been expected in the March ECB staff projections. According to the mechanical update, headline and core inflation for 2023 would be higher than projected in March. Underlying inflation was proving more persistent, which was argued to point to clear upside risks to the latest projections. While it was felt that the outlook for headline inflation in the medium term remained similar to that in the March projections, developments in underlying inflation had become more worrisome and pointed to increased persistence. Momentum in all components except for energy remained very high or had even increased, especially for services. Against this background, the inflation outlook in the March projections was judged to be too optimistic, as there was still no robust evidence of a turning point in underlying inflation, with a rising risk of inflation becoming more entrenched owing to higher wage growth and of inflation expectations becoming unanchored.

However, it was also argued that the Governing Council should not focus too much on monthly inflation data being 0.1 percentage point higher or lower. What mattered was whether a downward trend in inflation could be expected over the medium term, in line with the projections. Moreover, with respect to changes in the projection assumptions since the March cut-off date, the latest developments in oil prices, food commodity prices and the exchange rate would together mechanically imply a downward impact on inflation, looking ahead. While there were forces, such as wages, that would push inflation up, there were also several factors going in the other direction, including rising interest rates, a stronger exchange rate, lower energy prices, easing supply bottlenecks, an increasing labour supply and lower fiscal subsidies, all of which would be disinflationary.

Food price inflation was widely seen as another important factor behind the still elevated level of headline inflation. Pipeline pressures suggested that the pass-through of past cost shocks to consumer food prices remained incomplete, posing significant upside risks to food inflation in 2023. This also represented an upside risk to prices in related areas such as restaurants and hotel services, and thus to underlying inflation. While commodity prices were falling steeply, consumer prices remained very sticky, suggesting that expanding profit margins were preventing inflation from falling. At the same time, it was argued that a large part of the currently elevated food price inflation could still be explained by higher energy prices. Moreover, there was a big transportation component in food prices, which was labour and energy-intensive.

As regards developments in core inflation, the latest developments were broadly seen as worrisome. The level and momentum of inflation excluding energy and food continued to be very high, so that small improvements in core inflation or other measures of underlying inflation should not be interpreted as an indication of a turning point. Reference was made to the United States, where the policy-relevant measures of core inflation had already started to decline some time ago, albeit at a slow pace. It was argued that underlying inflation in the euro area appeared to be more stubborn and was likely to be stickier than in the United States, since wage and price-setting were typically less flexible in Europe. The observed strength and persistence of core inflation were seen to call into question the earlier hypothesis that euro area inflation was to a larger extent supply-driven and due to external shocks than a result of domestic demand. It was also pointed out that the momentum of services inflation was clearly on the rise, indicating that wages – a key component of services inflation – would become increasingly important in explaining underlying inflation, especially given the resilience in the labour market. Moreover, the demand for hospitality services was expected to strengthen further over the coming months, which should give an additional boost to services and core inflation. In this context reference was made to the recent developments in wage negotiations in the public sector of the largest euro area country, and to evidence of non-linearities and greater persistence in the reaction to pipeline pressures, all of which were worrying for the outlook for underlying inflation.

At the same time, the point was made that, given the earlier large increases in energy prices, it was natural that core inflation would only start to decline with a considerable lag, as also suggested by historical regularities. In this context, it was recalled that there was no stable predictive relationship between core or other indicators of underlying inflation and headline inflation one to two years ahead. If anything, the causality between core and headline inflation went in the opposite direction. Against this background, the view was expressed that too much attention was paid to core inflation, first because core inflation was not representative of the household consumption basket, and second because core inflation had no clear leading indicator properties for future headline inflation. It would therefore be beneficial to explain that the analysis of underlying inflation pressures took a wide range of indicators into account and went well beyond core inflation.

Members recalled that the trend in wages was key to understanding medium-term inflation pressures. Even if it were the case that wage developments had so far remained broadly in line with the March ECB staff projections, this did not necessarily provide reassurance that the trend in wage increases would prove consistent with the ECB’s inflation target. Moreover, some of the latest wage increases, notably in the public sector, were widely seen as worrisome and had not been included in the March projections. There were clear signs that unions had regained bargaining power, which was unlikely to recede. Reference was also made to empirical evidence that the public sector played a leading role in private sector wage-setting in a number of euro area countries.

More generally, as high inflation became more protracted, this exacerbated the underlying social conflict between workers and employers. Moreover, while wage claims had for a long time been in line with domestic inflation and productivity growth, recent wage claims were clearly higher than levels that would be consistent with this regularity in future if inflation declined as anticipated. Wage growth was increasing, with further risks to the upside. In the euro area such developments typically started late and slowly, but they might be hard to stop. Negotiated wages (including one-off payments) had grown by more than 5% year on year in January and February 2023. There had been a significant increase in the growth rate of compensation per employee, which, together with the weakening of labour productivity growth, had implied a sharp increase in unit labour costs.

At the same time, there was already substantial evidence that the longer inflation remained high, the stronger demands for higher wages would become, with second-round effects on other prices. The social dialogue was seen as coming under increasing strain in a number of countries, suggesting that the argument about wages versus profit was becoming more intense. It was therefore contended that signs of a wage-profit-price spiral were emerging. In addition, a remark was made that higher mortgage rates might also induce workers to demand higher wages, giving rise to another channel through which inflation could perpetuate itself.

However, it was also recalled that there were considerable differences in wage developments, so all 20 euro area countries had to be taken together to see what the implications for monetary policy for the whole of the euro area would be. In this context, it was mentioned that there was no uniform message from recent wage indicators. Developments in negotiated wages and the ECB’s wage tracker pointed to a continued acceleration, but the signal from the latter indicator was affected by compositional and methodological issues. By contrast, information from the Indeed online job-matching platform, which covered new hiring, was showing a deceleration in wage dynamics. In addition, it was pointed out that the observed reduction in the unemployment rate reflected both an increase in new hires and a remarkable reduction in unemployment duration, suggesting that European labour markets had become much more fluid than they used to be. This should be positive for productivity and could indeed justify some wage increases if they were related to more robust productivity growth. However, it was also observed that no increase in productivity had been seen in the available macro data so far.

Finally, it was pointed out that the cumulative increase in prices between 2021 and 2024 would be around 20%. This meant that nominal wage increases observed over the past year would need to be put into the context of a “catching-up” process, by which employees were trying to compensate for the lower real wages received for much of the period. The March ECB staff projections had therefore expected significant wage increases, recognising that real wages were likely to recover over the projection horizon. Nonetheless, it was noted that the March projections did foresee inflation eventually coming back to target even with very substantial nominal wage increases. However, it was also argued that the cost of an adverse terms-of-trade shock could not be compensated but had to be shared between workers and employers. Moreover, the benign inflation outcome depicted in the baseline scenario of the staff projections was subject to large upside risks, as higher wages were likely to have a protracted impact and would increase inflation persistence, especially if not absorbed by lower profit margins.

Together with increasing wage pressures, recent elevated profits were seen as warranting closer monitoring. In some countries and sectors profit margins had grown very strongly at the end of last year. Unit profits in the euro area had contributed more than half of the domestic price pressures in the last quarter of 2022. As wage inflation had been much lower than price inflation, profits were plainly on the rise, with prices often clearly outpacing increases in input costs and wages. If wages were chasing prices and profits were chasing wages, this could be an explanation for the increased persistence of high inflation. To fully understand the implications for inflation, it was therefore important to see how profits would develop in the future. In this context, the Corporate Telephone Survey was sending a clear message, suggesting that companies had indeed been able to attain ample mark-ups in 2022, but they did not think that this would persist during the current year. As companies were passing on the higher input costs, it was likely that a reversal of this process would be seen in 2023, with wages contributing more and profits less, in line with past regularities.

As regards longer-term inflation expectations, members recalled that inflation expectations mattered a lot in wage negotiations. In particular, higher inflation expectations today could give rise to higher inflation over a prolonged period because of the long duration of wage agreements. Inflation expectations also mattered a lot in firms’ price-setting. Repeated upside surprises and target overshoots over a long period of time could erode trust in the ECB’s ability and willingness to bring inflation back to the 2% target. Maintaining the credibility of the ECB’s commitment to price stability was especially challenging in light of substantial lags in policy transmission. Attention was drawn to the increase in consumer inflation expectations in March. The question was raised as to whether this could be related to persistently high food inflation, with energy prices having declined significantly.

Against this background, a large number of members assessed the risks to price stability as being clearly tilted to the upside over the policy-relevant horizon, while other members judged that the risks were more symmetric, especially beyond the near term. Overall, the Governing Council assessed that there were still significant upside risks to the inflation outlook. These included existing pipeline pressures that could send retail prices higher than expected in the near term. Moreover, Russia’s war against Ukraine could again push up the costs of energy and food. A lasting rise in inflation expectations above target, or higher than anticipated increases in wages or profit margins, could also drive inflation higher, including over the medium term. Recently negotiated wage agreements had added to the upside risks to inflation, especially if profit margins remained high. The downside risks included renewed financial market tensions, which could bring inflation down faster than projected. Weaker demand, due, for example, to a more marked slowing of bank lending or a stronger transmission of monetary policy, would also lead to lower price pressures than currently anticipated, especially over the medium term.

Turning to the monetary and financial analysis, members largely concurred with the assessment provided by Mr Lane in his introduction. Policy rate increases were being transmitted strongly to risk-free interest rates and to financing conditions for firms, households and banks. Growth in loans to firms and households had weakened owing to higher borrowing rates, tighter credit supply conditions and lower demand. The tightening of overall credit standards reported in the latest round of the bank lending survey was stronger than banks had expected in the previous survey round, which suggested that lending might weaken further. The observed weakness in lending meant that money growth had also continued to decline.

It was argued that some of the stronger tightening of credit standards reported in the survey, beyond the level that had been expected by banks in the previous survey round, was likely to be attributable to the recent tensions in the global banking system. At the same time, it was argued that there was no indication of a credit crunch and bank lending seemed to reflect mainly weaker loan demand rather than any quantitative constraints. The view was also expressed that it was surprising that the recent stress and uncertainty in the banking sector had had such a limited impact on the results of the bank lending survey, which had reported unchanged net tightening for loans to firms compared with the previous quarter and an expected deceleration in the pace of tightening in the period ahead. Moreover, it was recalled that the tightening of credit standards had come after a long period of very favourable credit developments, so, to some extent, it reflected a normalisation. In addition, it was felt that the observed tightening of bank lending standards and declining loan demand were welcome evidence that monetary policy transmission was working. Furthermore, access to financing was not seen as a major problem for firms, as was reflected in responses to the European Commission’s business survey regarding obstacles to production. However, credit developments were weakening. When measured in real terms, the contraction in loans to firms as a proportion of GDP was particularly pronounced and similar to the contractions observed in 2008 and in 2011.

Overall, members assessed financing conditions to have tightened since the March monetary policy meeting, while the picture of market-based financial conditions was mixed across markets. The acute strains that arose in financial markets in early March had diminished, as reflected in measures of systemic stress and volatility which had returned to levels seen prior to the emergence of the financial market tensions. Nevertheless, bank stock prices remained notably lower than before the tensions, although they were still higher than at the beginning of the year, while bank bond spreads over risk-free rates had widened somewhat. Banks’ funding costs had risen from low levels, as banks had to compensate for outflows from overnight deposits with more expensive time deposits and market-based debt. This would increase the supply pressure in the market for bank bonds, which was already elevated as banks took steps to pre-fund the large reimbursement due on the targeted longer-term refinancing operation (TLTRO) expiring in June. Yet short-term funding conditions in the interbank market had returned to levels seen prior to the onset of the banking sector tensions. In this context, it was argued that the financial market tensions had led to both a faster increase in funding costs for banks and a faster transmission of monetary policy to financing conditions than previously expected.

Members expressed confidence in the resilience of European banks. Banks were increasingly reporting profits linked to rising net interest income. In this context, it was underlined that financial stress or instability was far from a level that might jeopardise the transmission of monetary policy. Nevertheless, financial fragilities might still surface, with the unprecedented policy rate tightening cycle exposing financial imbalances that had built up during the period of low interest rates. Against this background, the remark was made that it was, in any case, important to uphold the separation principle, which called for the monetary policy stance to be assessed independently of risks related to financial stability, with these being addressed, if needed, by dedicated means.

Monetary policy stance and policy considerations

Turning to the assessment of the monetary policy stance, members evaluated the data obtained since the previous monetary policy meeting against the three criteria specified at the March meeting as being important in driving the Governing Council’s reaction to the unfolding circumstances. These criteria comprised (i) the implications of the incoming economic and financial data for the inflation outlook, (ii) the dynamics of underlying inflation, and (iii) the strength of monetary policy transmission.

Starting with the inflation outlook, members broadly concurred with the assessment that, with inflation outturns having again surprised on the upside, the outlook continued to be for too high inflation for too long. The risk of a severe economic downturn and the risk of an impact on financial stability had both eased, and hence some of the factors exerting downward pressure on inflation had receded. These considerations tended to support the inference that inflation risks had moved further to the upside since the March monetary policy meeting. At the same time, commodity prices had fallen, financing conditions had tightened and the effective exchange rate of the euro had appreciated. On balance, weighing up the different factors, it could be concluded that the medium-term inflation outlook was still broadly consistent with the March staff projections.

Members assessed the evidence regarding measures of underlying inflation as being a source of concern. While core inflation had edged down slightly, indicators of underlying inflation ranged overall between 4% and 7%, giving a mixed picture. The momentum of services inflation was clearly on the rise, with wages expected to become increasingly important in explaining underlying inflation. HICP inflation excluding energy and food was still very high and its momentum was rising, while strong wage growth was expected to prevail, with the risk of more persistent inflation as well as the possibility of second-round effects.

Turning to the assessment of monetary policy transmission, members noted that there was now more solid evidence that monetary policy was being transmitted to financing and credit conditions. This was generally seen as a positive development, suggesting that the first stages of transmission were working. The still strong dynamics of underlying inflation could be a reflection of a slower than expected transmission of monetary policy to inflation. On the other hand, it was also argued that, with a very strong labour market and longer interest rate fixation periods for bank loans, transmission could be weaker than usual. However, it was noted that a further tightening of bank credit conditions was still in the pipeline, as the full extent of policy rate increases had not yet been reflected in bank lending rates and credit growth. Furthermore, uncertainty about the transmission channels was currently higher than usual. This was because the extra tightening impulse that, according to the bank lending survey, would result from banks’ more cautious lending decisions following the recent banking sector tensions, was hard to quantify precisely and warranted continuous monitoring.

Overall, it was felt that the conditions were not in place to “declare victory” or to be complacent about the inflation outlook. Instead, members concurred that further tightening was needed to bring inflation back to target over the medium term. High inflation was seen to be hurting the most vulnerable parts of society and weakening the euro area’s economic performance.

Emphasis was placed on the evidence that various measures of longer-term inflation expectations had edged up above 2%, indicating risks of an unanchoring of inflation expectations. In particular, market-based measures of longer-term expectations remained stubbornly high, which could partly be attributed to the level of risk premia, suggesting that investors saw upside risks to longer-term inflation prevailing over downside risks. Over shorter horizons, market-based measures of inflation expectations stood below staff inflation projections. Monitoring the inflation expectations of households and firms was also seen as important because they mattered in wage negotiations and firms’ price-setting.

Monetary policy decisions and communication

Against this background, members agreed that a tightening of the monetary policy stance by increasing interest rates further was warranted.

A number of members initially expressed a preference for increasing the key ECB interest rates by 50 basis points in view of the risks to the inflation outlook posed by continued upside inflation surprises and inflation projected to be above target over at least four years, as well as by the elevated risk of an unanchoring of inflation expectations. Such a step would more clearly demonstrate the Governing Council’s determination to achieve price stability in the face of elevated and more persistent inflation. More decisive action was warranted to move rates into sufficiently restrictive territory to ensure a timely return of inflation to target. These members saw the risk of tightening rates too much as being less than the risk of tightening them too little. Moreover, the view was expressed that the financial market turbulence had been short-lived and had not exerted a meaningful additional tightening impulse. Furthermore, the resilience of the euro area economy and receding recession risks, together with broadening price and wage pressures, suggested that underlying inflation was unlikely to decelerate sufficiently soon, which gave rise to increased risks of an unanchoring of expectations.

At the same time, most of these members indicated that they could accept the proposed rate increase of 25 basis points. The ECB’s communication should, however, convey a clear “directional bias” to underline that, on the basis of the present outlook, further interest rate increases would be warranted in order to return inflation to target and to avoid a smaller rate increase being misinterpreted as signalling the prospect of a pause in the current hiking cycle.

Against this background, almost all members supported the 25 basis point rate rise as proposed by Mr Lane, in combination with clear communication that, on the basis of the current data, monetary policy still had more ground to cover. This decision was seen as striking the right balance between meeting the need for further rate increases and accounting for elevated uncertainty about the speed and strength of monetary policy transmission. Since interest rates were already in restrictive territory, raising rates by 25 basis points was seen as preferable, including from a risk management perspective. This magnitude was viewed as prudent, with the possible costs of larger increments outweighing the benefits, given the still elevated uncertainty and the perception that the transmission of much of the impact of previous rate increases was still pending. In addition, the point was made that a smaller increment than those decided since July 2022 would allow the Governing Council to keep raising rates for longer, if underlying inflation pressures persisted or even strengthened through the summer, until there was sufficiently strong evidence that a turning point had been reached and inflation was retreating at an adequate pace. Emphasis was put on the merit of keeping to a data-dependent, meeting-by-meeting approach in an uncertain environment and with rates moving closer to a possible “landing zone”. A return to a more standard size of rate increment was also justified in view of the fact that the various monetary policy instruments were reinforcing each other in the transmission of the monetary policy stance.

On this basis it was concluded that reducing the size of the increment from 50 to 25 basis points could be justified for two main reasons. First, substantial ground had been covered thus far, with the Governing Council having raised rates by 350 basis points over nine months, which implied that rates were getting closer to their destination, though they were not there yet. Second, the smaller rate increase also reflected uncertainty about the impact of past decisions, with a great deal of this impact still being in the pipeline. Slowing the pace of rate hikes was also seen as helping the right conclusions to be drawn about the destination. At the same time, it was underlined that reducing the size of the rate increment should not be interpreted as signalling that the Governing Council had opened the door to a pause in its monetary policy tightening cycle.

Members generally agreed that the data-dependent approach, combined with the communication about the ECB’s reaction function issued following the March meeting, had served the Governing Council well. Financial markets were assessing progress in terms of the inflation outlook, underlying inflation and the transmission of monetary policy, and were pricing in interest rates accordingly. It was argued that communication should emphasise the importance of being persistent and tenacious, and should make it clear that once the peak rate was reached rates would stay at that level for some time and the increases would not be reversed immediately.

As regards communication of the Governing Council’s directional bias, members agreed that it was appropriate to affirm that the Governing Council’s future decisions would ensure that the policy rates would be brought to levels that were sufficiently restrictive to achieve a timely return of inflation to the ECB’s 2% medium-term target, and would be kept at those levels for as long as necessary. At the same time, there was a strong preference against returning to outright forward guidance on policy rates, which was not regarded as a suitable instrument when rates were well above their lower bound and was seen as inconsistent with the meeting-by-meeting approach to decision-making that remained warranted in a volatile environment.

Turning to the policies affecting the size and composition of the Eurosystem’s balance sheet, members widely agreed with Mr Lane’s proposal to announce the Governing Council’s expectation of discontinuing, as of July 2023, the reinvestment of maturing securities in the APP portfolio.

Members recalled the reasons why the balance sheet needed to be normalised. First, ending reinvestments in July was seen as being consistent with the current monetary policy stance and with the need to support the reduction in excess liquidity, complementing the expiry of the large TLTRO operation in June. In addition, progress with balance sheet normalisation was needed to regain policy space for possible future situations in which policy rates again came close to the lower bound and in order to adhere to the principle of proportionality. In this regard, while the APP had been introduced to provide additional monetary accommodation and to compress term premia when rates were at the lower bound, in the current conditions of ample excess liquidity and upside price pressures, the proportionality of continuing the partial reinvestment policy was questionable. Moreover, the current level of excess liquidity was not necessary to implement the desired monetary policy stance. Furthermore, normalisation was needed to reduce the side effects of a large balance sheet, including the risk of fiscal dominance, the exposure to credit and duration risk, and the impact on financial stability risks and on market functioning. Finally, from a longer-term perspective, a steeper yield curve would support banks’ intermediation capacity via maturity transformation. By contrast, keeping down term premia via the APP securities holdings for longer than necessary could negatively affect bank balance sheets and therefore the provision of credit to the private sector.

Members widely viewed financial markets as being able to digest a full portfolio run-off, having calmed after the turbulent weeks in mid-March. Market absorption had been very smooth even in times of market turbulence and despite relatively front-loaded government bond issuance this year. Overall, financial markets were seen as having largely priced in a full run-off by the summer, implying that the impact on long-term yields was likely to be limited.

It was recalled, however, that the reduction in the stock of securities held in the APP portfolio would be accompanied by a considerable decline in excess liquidity linked to the upcoming sizeable TLTRO repayments, with the largest coming due in June. Moreover, the fact that the June repayments were fully expected and priced in by markets did not preclude any impact if liquidity was withdrawn, because a fast contraction of the Eurosystem balance sheet could have wider implications for the financial sector. Over time there was likely to be some pressure on yields, a rise in interest rates on bank deposits, a rotation in household savings from investment funds back into term deposits as the rates on them increased, and a rise in demand for bonds from investment funds.

Reference was made to the need to monitor the composition of the APP portfolio in order to assess whether the composition across and within asset classes remained compatible both with the intended monetary policy stance and with the ECB’s Treaty requirement to support the general economic policies in the EU, as also reflected in the ECB’s monetary policy strategy. In particular, a request was made to assess whether the overall composition of the portfolio remained aligned with climate goals of the Paris Agreement.

Caution was also expressed against too fast a contraction in the Eurosystem balance sheet. Owing to the TLTRO repayments, the expected pace of the reduction in the balance sheet was already quite fast, while the impact of the APP run-off on the lowering of inflation was seen as small. Moreover, the remark was made that the optimal size of the balance sheet in the long run was uncertain. Some members saw benefits in leaving an announcement about adjustments to APP reinvestments until June or in providing only a directional communication following the present meeting, while deciding on the exact calibration of reinvestments after the second quarter of 2023, at the June monetary policy meeting. This would allow a more complete assessment of the impact of TLTRO reimbursements in June amid lower liquidity during the summer months and was seen as beneficial in view of the high uncertainty and market volatility. Overall, the process of reducing reinvestments under the APP, including the Governing Council’s communication of this process, was seen as a success. The expected and realised balance sheet normalisation had already delivered a tightening of longer-term yields, thus supporting the policy stance, while at the same time not measurably increasing volatility.

Against this background, members were ready to join the consensus in support of Mr Lane’s proposal, subject to reiterating the principles of gradualism and predictability when announcing the expectation that reinvestment under the APP would be discontinued as of July.

Taking into account the foregoing discussion among the members, upon a proposal by the President, the Governing Council took the monetary policy decisions as set out in the monetary policy press release. The members of the Governing Council subsequently finalised the monetary policy statement, which the President and the Vice-President would, as usual, deliver at the press conference following the Governing Council meeting.

GBP/USD Price Outlook: Cable Bid after the Fed Signal a “Skip” in June

GBP/USD Price Outlook: Cable Bid after the Fed Signal a “Skip” in June

Cable Rises on the Fed’s Increased Probability of a “Skip” at the June FOMC

The dollar’s rise observed throughout most of May has changed course amid increasing support for a ‘skip’ at this month’s FOMC decision. Fed Governors Philip Jefferson and Patrick Harker sent a message to the market yesterday as both permanent voters expressed a preference to skip a potential interest rate hike this month. The option to skip a hike provides the rate setting committee with greater flexibility to hike further down the line or essentially pause hikes depending on the incoming data.

Market implied probabilities of a rate hike this month sat at 71% ahead of the comments yesterday and this morning has reversed, now down at just 42.4%. Such a massive shift in sentiment leaves the dollar vulnerable and opens the door for GBP/USD to claw back recent losses.

Major Risk Events to end off the Week

There was a notable lack of high impact UK economic data this week with the US very much the focus towards the end of the week. After last night’s crucial house vote to suspend the US debt ceiling, attention now turns to the Senate but political commentators suggest that a deal is largely expected to become law from here on out. Away from the political arena, US non-farm payroll data is due on Friday as consensus estimates foresee a lower number of jobs were added in May with a slight uptick in unemployment. The Fed will also keep a keen eye on average hourly earnings as far as it influences general price pressures.

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Customize and filter live economic data via our DailyFX economic calendar

GBP/USD Technical Analysis and Levels of Interest

Cable has moved above both the 50 SMA and the prior zone of resistance at 1.2445 as the dollar eases. GBP/USD bulls will naturally be eying the swing high of 1.2676 and general zone of resistance around 1.2700. A more immediate benchmark of bullish momentum comes into play at 1.2585.

The RSI trades a little above the middle ground, suggesting that there is more room for upside continuation before the pair enters overbought territory. On the bearish side, if the pair is to move lower from here, 1.2345 and the recent swing low at 1.2308 emerge as most relevant levels of support.

GBP/USD Daily Chart

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The weekly chart helps to put shorter-term moves into perspective. Cable remains within the broader longer-term uptrend which adds to the bullish outlook.

GBP/USD Weekly Chart

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Institutional and Retail Positioning Snapshot

Common Trend Observed but Divergence Appears in Near-Term Direction

Large hedge funds and speculators reveal a rather mixed view on sterling according to data up until 23 May, reported on 26 May. Long positioning (orange line) sits ever so slightly above short positioning (blue line), as cable appears to be making another move to the upside.

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Source: Refinitiv, prepared by Richard Snow

On the other hand, IG client sentiment, which also shows a slight net-long positioning, reveals a reduction in recent longs and an uptick in recent shorts. Being the contrarian indicator that it is, a pick up in shorts with a reduction of longs hints at a potential bullish advance despite overall positioning ever so slightly on the long side.

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GBP/USD:Retail trader data shows 50.34% of traders are net-long with the ratio of traders long to short at 1.01 to 1.

We typically take a contrarian view to crowd sentiment, and the fact traders are net-long suggests GBP/USD prices may continue to fall.

The number of traders net-long is 6.31% lower than yesterday and 17.37% lower from last week, while the number of traders net-short is 11.69% higher than yesterday and 18.40% higher from last week.

Yet traders are less net-long than yesterday and compared with last week. Recent changes in sentiment warn that the current GBP/USD price trend may soon reverse higher despite the fact traders remain net-long.

US Dollar Steadies After Fed’s Push Back

US Dollar Steadies After Fed’s Push Back

Overview: The market was gearing up for a June Fed hike and officials and this helped lift the greenback. However, the Fed Governor Jefferson, nominated to be the next vice-chair, pushed back against it. His views are thought to reflect the Fed’s leadership. Philadelphia Fed’s Harker, who is a voting member of the FOMC also backed a pause. This is not quite what we expected when we suggested the US interest rate adjustment was complete or nearly so. Still, it broke the dollar’s upside momentum, though follow-through dollar selling today has been limited. It is narrowly mixed, with the Swiss franc and euro leading G10 with 0.15-0.20% gains. The dollar slipped through JPY139 briefly but as US rates have come back a bit firmer, the greenback has recovered to almost JPY140. Emerging market currencies are also mixed, but of note the Turkish lira, South African rand, and Chinese yuan are sporting softer profiles.

The House of Representatives approved the US debt-ceiling bill late yesterday and now goes to the Senate, which is expected to pass it will less drama. Asia Pacific equities were mixed, but Europe’s Stoxx 600 is snapping a three-day slide and is up about 0.75%. US equity futures are trading with a firmer bias. Benchmark 10-year yields are 1-2 bp higher in Europe and the 10-year Treasury yield is up about three basis points to 3.67%. If sustained, it would be the first increase since last Thursday. Gold is little changed as it consolidates the recover that took it from near $1932 on Tuesday to almost $1975 yesterday. It held above $1950 on the early attempt at support and is around $1960 in late European morning dealings. July WTI dropped from about $73.35 Tuesday to a low yesterday near $67. It is little changed now near $68. API reportedly estimated US stocks rose 5.2 mln barrels and there continues to be speculation that some OPEC members may extend voluntary production cuts at the weekend meeting.

Asia Pacific

It is not that China’s May PMI was out of line with other major economies, experiencing a contraction in manufacturing and expanding services. Rather, after the end of the zero-Covid policy, many had hoped for a stronger and more sustained recovery. Headwinds from longer-term structural challenges are cited as the reason for the disappointment. Earlier today, Caixin manufacturing PMI unexpectedly rose to 50.9 from 49.5. It was expected to be unchanged. Yet, because it relies on a smaller sample and does not match the “official” PMI many are dismissive, suggesting no change in sentiment. After falling by 1% yesterday, the CSI 300 edged up by 0.2% today. Even before the disappointing industrial profits and PMI, there had been speculation of some more monetary support in the form of interest rates reductions and/or a cut in required reserves. In addition, there are reports suggest Beijing is considering new tax incentives for high-end manufacturing. This seems to be a reflecting both economic support and concern about supply chain security.

Japan’s preliminary Q1 GDP estimate of 0.4% (quarter-over-quarter) was boosted by stronger-than-expected business investment (0.9% vs. forecasts for a contraction). Today’s Q1 cap spending report showing an 11% surge was nearly double the median projection in Bloomberg’s survey and warns of the risk of an upward revision to Q1 GDP. It is the biggest quarterly increase since Q2 18. Separately, the final May manufacturing PMI slipped to 50.6 from the flash estimate of 50.8, but still up from 49.5 in April and the first reading above 50 in seven months. Lastly, the weekly MOF portfolio flow report show the foreign buying spree of Japan assets went into reverse from the nearly JPY1.98 tln (~$14.3 bln) to a liquidation of JPY267.5 bln. Japanese investors continued to return to the global bond market after divesting heavily last year. Their appetite for foreign stocks remains soft. Japanese investors bought JPY1.03 trillion foreign bonds and sold JPY657 bln of foreign stocks.

Australia’s May manufacturing PMI final reading was 48.4, up from 48.0 of the flash estimates. It was at 48.0 in April and stood at 50.2 at the end of 2022 and was 55.7 in May last year. Governor Lowe of the Reserve Bank of Australia said, like other central bankers, that it is data dependent. But it begs the question of which data. The monthly CPI rose in April for the first time this year. April jobs and retail sales were weaker than expected. There has been a significant adjustment in Australian short-term rates in May as the market reassesses the outlook for central bank policy. The two-year yield rose from 3.0% on May 1 to 3.65% at the end of last week. It is now a little below 3.60%. The odds of a quarter-point by the end of Q3 has risen from no chance to fully discounted. The Australian dollar fell by about 1.7% in May, its fourth consecutive monthly loss.

The gyrations in US rates first saw the dollar fall to a five-day low slightly below JPY139 and then rebound back to almost JPY140. There are ae options for JPY590 at JPY140 that expire today and another JPY560 mln at JPY139. While the dollar may push back above JPY140 in the North American session, we look for it to hold below yesterday’s high near JPY140.40. The Australian dollar is straddling the $0.6500 area and has thus far been confined today to about a fifth of a cent band on both sides. A move above $0.6540-60 would help stabilize the tone. A break now below $0.6480 signals more work is needed to forge a low. The greenback extended its gains against the Chinese yuan to reach nearly CNY7.1240. It is the fourth consecutive gain and 16 of the past 19 sessions. The PBOC set the dollar’s reference rate at CNY7.0965. The median projection in Bloomberg’s survey was CNY7.0975. We had anticipated the dollar to rise into the CNY7.07-CNY7.11 area. The next target may be in the CNY7.17-CNY7.20 area.

Europe

Germany, France, and Spain all reported softer than expected May CPI. Italy was the disappointment among the large EMU member, with a 0.3% month-over-month gain. It had been forecast (median in Bloomberg’s survey) to fall by 0.2%. Due to the base effect, the year-over-year pace eased to 8.1% from 8.7%. The aggregate figure showed unchanged monthly rate and a 6.1% year-over-year pace, down from 7.0% in April and amid forecasts for a 6.3% rate. The core rate ticked down for the second consecutive month, though at 5.3% it remains near the peak of 5.7% set in March. Separately, Eurostat reported that EMU’s unemployment rate remains at its record low of 6.5%.

The eurozone final manufacturing PMI was edged slightly higher from the preliminary read of 44.6 to 44.8. It was at 45.8 in April and 47.8 at the end of last year, and 54.6 in May 2022. Germany’s final reading was at 43.2 (from 42.9 flash and 44.5 in April), the weakest since May 2020. France’s final manufacturing PMI reading slipped back to 45.7 from the initial estimate of 46.1 and 45.6 in April. Spain’s manufacturing PMI slowed to 48.4 from 49.0, a little better than expected, while Italy’s ticked down to 45.9 from 46.8. There is no sign that the contraction in manufacturing is ending.

The UK may have avoided the worst-case scenarios of a protracted recession, it is not out of the woods. Inflation is stubborn. It is running at a 7.5% annualized clip through the first four months of the year. That compares with a 4.2% pace in the US and 6.3% in the eurozone. Nationwide reported today that its house price index in May is off 3.4% from a year ago, the biggest decline since 2009. The UK’s manufacturing sector is remains under pressure. The PMI has been below 50 since last August. Today’s final reading slipped to 47.1. While better than the flash estimate of 46.9, it is the lowest this year. There has been a dramatic increase in UK rates. The two-year yield rose from about 3.66% on May 4 to 4.57% at end of last week. It is near 4.35% today. The swaps market has a quarter-point hike fully discounted for the June 22 meeting and has about a 10% chance of a 50 bp move. The year-end rate is seen near 5.35%, up from 4.80% as recently as mid-May.

After falling to $1.0635 yesterday, the euro stabilized with the help of the broader dollar pullback on the decline in US rates. It has been confined to about a third of a cent below $1.07, where options for nearly 2.2 bln euros expire today. There is another set for 1.15 bln euros at $1.0730. It may take a soft US jobs report tomorrow for the euro to begin repairing the technical damage inflicted when the market had a nearly 70% chance of a quarter-point Fed hike discounted. The intraday momentum indicators warn that the market may sell euros like it did yesterday when it briefly poked above $1.07. For the third consecutive session, sterling has run into offers in the $1.2450 area. That said, it has held $1.2400, just above the five-day moving average. Even if the $1.2450 area yields, the $1.2475-$1.2500 area may offer formidable resistance. On the downside, the $1.2300 area offers support.

America

The unexpected surge in the April US jobs openings (10.1 mln after an upwardly revised 9.75 mln in March helped sustain the dollar’s firmer tone and injected some volatility in the debt market. The April results were above all the estimates in Bloomberg’s survey. Openings were led by retail trade, health care, transportation, and warehousing. Job openings fell in hotels and food services, business services, and manufacturing, still overall the ratio of openings to the number of unemployed, often cited by Fed officials rose to 1.8 in April, the highest in three months. Hiring increased, while layoffs slowed (led by construction, leisure, and hospitality). The quits rate (voluntary jobs leavers as a share of total employment) fell to more than a two-year low. A caveat with this survey has seen a sharp drop off in the response rate. It is around 30%, half of what it was before the pandemic.

There is a slew of US economic data due today. The market may be most sensitive the ADP private sector jobs estimate (even though it does a poor job tracking the BLS monthly estimate) and the ISM manufacturing survey. Weekly jobless claims on the eve of the national figures loses some of its potential impact. The final manufacturing PMI will not contain much new information. Because auto sales trickle out over the course of the day, they do not have as much market impact as their importance would suggest. After a strong rebound in April to 15.9 mln vehicles on a seasonally adjusted annual basis, the most since May 2021, they are expected to have softened in May. That said, the median projection in Bloomberg for a 15.3 mln pace would be a 20% increase over May 2022. The Atlanta’s Fed’s GDP tracker will be updated today. It was slashed last week to 1.9% from 2.9%.

The market may be delivering the Fed a fait accompli for a hike at the June 13-14 meeting, but the Fed pushed back yesterday. Governor Jefferson and Philadelphia Fed President Harker (voter) talked about the benefits of a hawkish pause. Fed Chair Powell opened the door to a possible pause at the May 3 FOMC meeting and made a robust defense of it a couple of weeks later. A combination of better-than-expected data, including strong demand and resilient labor market, and hawkish comments be several Fed members, including a couple of middle-of-the road officials, has spurred a significant adjustment. The market was pricing in about a 2/3 chance of a quarter-point hike on June 14 before Jefferson and Harker spoke and knocked the odds back below 35%. We had argued that the interest rate adjustment in the US was over or nearly, and the US two-year yield has fallen 25 bp since the high from the end of last week. The interest rate adjustment was a key part to the dollar’s three-week rally, and we had expected the dollar to become better offered when the interest rate support softened. That said, it often happens with a lag.

Canada and Mexico see the manufacturing PMI, which tend to have limited market impact. Mexico also reports the IMEF surveys, the central bank minutes when it paused (completed?) its rate hiking cycle. Mexico also reports April work remittances. In Q1 23, they have averaged $4.65 bln a month. In Q1 22, remittances, which mostly come from the US, averaged $4.17 bln. Worker remittances have emerged an important source of capital inflows into Mexico. Consider that in Q1 19, worker remittances averaged $2.65 bln a month. Banxico Governor Rodriguez signaled the intention to keep the cash target rate at 11.25% for the next couple of months before even discussing a rate cut. The central bank raise this year’s GDP forecast to 2.3% from 1.6% it projected in March, while cutting shaving the year-end inflation forecast to 4.7% from 4.9%.

Stronger-than-expected Q1 Canadian GDP (3.1% annualized after Q4 22 was revised to a 0.1% contraction) lent the Canadian dollar support amid the strong greenback performance. However, the risk-of mood, exemplified by the sharp drop in the S&P 500 seemed to deter much CAD buying. The swaps market marginally increased the chances of hike next week to about 35%. It was less than 10% in early May. Canada’s two-year yield has risen from 3.46% on May 4 to 4.33% at the start of the week. The US dollar held slightly below last week’s high (~CAD1.3655) but found support near CAD1.3575. It has given way to a marginal new low toward near CAD1.3560. A break of the CAD1.3550 area could signal a return to CAD!.3500. The risk-off mood soured the demand for the Mexican peso. The US dollar rose to a three-day high, slightly above MXN17.77. A move above MXN17.80 would re-target the MXN18.00 area that was tested (and held) on May 23-34. The peso is trading quietly at little changed levels. Initial dollar support is seen around MXN17.63.

 

 

Gold Price Boosted as Treasury Yields Slip Ahead of Debt Ceiling Resolution

Gold Price Boosted as Treasury Yields Slip Ahead of Debt Ceiling Resolution

The gold price has found firmer footing this week with the US Dollar pausing in its recent bull run and Treasury yields easing after a push higher into the end of last month.

Commodity markets have been mixed with some industrial metals facing headwinds with global growth prospects being questioned after some underwhelming data this week.

For base metals, yesterday’s weak Chinese PMI numbers are of concern due to the large volume of raw materials it requires to fuel its economic expansion.

However, today we saw the Caixin PMI number improve to 50.9 from the 49.5 anticipated and previously. This PMI number is a survey of smaller Chinese companies with a narrower sample than the official PMI. All the latest economic data can be seen on the DailFX.com economic calendar here.

For gold and silver though, the rolling over of Treasury yields appears to have underpinned the precious metals.

Across most of the curve, US government bonds are back to yields that were last seen in early March when the regional banking crisis kicked off with the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank Financial.

The benchmark 2-year bond tapped out at 4.63% last Friday after having dipped to 3.66% earlier this month. It is now trading near 4.40% going into Thursday.

In the days ahead the US debt ceiling deal is due to be passed through the US legislature in order to avoid a default. It passed through the House of Representatives late Wednesday Washington time and will now go to the Senate for approval.

Assuming this is passed without incident, the focus for the market might return to speculation around the Federal Reserve and its monetary policy intentions going forward.

The commentary from several Fed speakers appears to be messaging for a pause at the June 14th Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting.

Overnight, Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank President Patrick Harker and Fed Governor Philip Jefferson both intimated that the Fed should ‘skip’ a hike at the next gathering.

Interest rate markets see little chance of a hike in June but are scoping around an 80% probability of a 25 basis point lift at the July conclave.

The path for US interest rates is somewhat uncertain and the impact on the Treasury market might be more volatility. This could translate into choppy trading conditions for the US Dollar. In turn, gold may see movements dependent on these factors.

GC1 (GOLD FRONT FUTURES CONTRACT) TECHNICAL ANALYSIS

Gold remains in an ascending trend channel that began in November last year and earlier this week it tested the lower bound of that channel, but the support area held.

The ascending trend line also coincided with two previous lows and the 100-day Simple Moving Average (SMA). This zone may continue to provide support, currently in the 1936 – 1945 area.

If these support levels are broken, a bearish run may evolve, and the next support zone of note could be at the Double Bottom of 1811 and 1813. The 200- and 260-day SMAs are currently just above these levels and may lend support.

The early May high of 2085 eclipsed the March 2022 peak of 2079 but was unable to overcome the all-time high of 2089. This failure to break new ground to the upside has created a Triple Top which is an extension of a Double Top formation.

This has set up a potential resistance zone in the 2080 – 2090 area but a snap above those levels may indicate evolving bullishness. The next level of resistance could be at the upper ascending trend channel line that is currently near 2160.

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Making Sense of Japanese Yen’s Recent Slide: Is it the Start of a Renewed Leg Lower?

Making Sense of Japanese Yen’s Recent Slide: Is it the Start of a Renewed Leg Lower?

There are a couple of things that stand out on the charts of the Japanese yen against the US dollar and the closely correlated US Treasury yields recently that could have implications for the trend in the coming weeks.

On the monthly charts of USD/JPY, despite the near 10% rally from February, there is hardly any noticeable improvement in momentum (14-month Relative Strength Index). The last time a similar development took place, the spot subsequently went sideways for months. Such conditions typically signify an ‘unwinding’ of bullish conditions, instead of a renewed leg higher. Eventually, momentum normalized to a level that created the foundations in 2021 for a big rally.

USD/JPY Monthly Chart

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This time around, USD/JPY has achieved its measured target of 50.00 – equal to the 2012-2015 bullish move. So, in a sense, it has ‘done its part’ for now (the risk is that the extension turns out to be more than 100% of the move).

US Treasury 10-year Yield Weekly Chart

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Similarly, momentum (14-month RSI) on the US Treasury 10-year yield monthly chart hasn’t improved materially, even as the yield has most recently broken above key resistance at the April high of 3.64%. The yield continues to be in a well-established downward-sloping range (see the weekly chart).

USD/JPY Quarterly Chart

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From a longer-term perspective, as highlighted at the end of 2022 (see “Japanese Yen Q1 Technical Forecast: USD/JPY to Consolidate Further”, USD/JPY posted a bearish reversal candle on the quarterly charts in December at significant converged resistance. Similarly, the US Treasury 10-year yield has struggled to clear the stiff converged barrier on the 89-quarter moving average, near the upper edge of the Ichimoku channel on the quarterly charts.

US Treasury 10-year Yield Quarterly Chart

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The upshot of the above is that the break above 138.00 barrier may not be a sign of renewed strength in USD/JPY. Indeed, it could be part of a broader sideway range developing. If past is any guide, there needs to be a significant build-up in momentum or the bullish conditions would need to be unwound enough to set the stage for a renewed bullish cycle.

USD/JPY Daily Chart

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Having said that, there are no imminent signs of a reversal even as USD/JPY has encountered some hurdles, including the upper edge of a rising channel from January (see the daily chart). As the colour-coded 240-minute candlestick charts show, based on trending/momentum indicators, USD/JPY remains in a broad bullish phase from a short-term perspective. Unless it falls below immediate converged support at 137.75-138.50 (including the 89-period moving average and the early-May high), the path of least resistance remains sideways to up for now.

USD/JPY 240-minute Chart

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Note: In the above colour-coded charts, Blue candles represent a Bullish phase. Red candles represent a Bearish phase. Grey candles serve as Consolidation phases (within a Bullish or a Bearish phase), but sometimes they tend to form at the end of a trend. Note: Candle colors are not predictive – they merely state what the current trend is. Indeed, the candle color can change in the next bar. False patterns can occur around the 200-period moving average, or around a support/resistance and/or in sideways/choppy market. The author does not guarantee the accuracy of the information. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Users of the information do so at their own risk.